University regulation in Scotland
15 September 2026
Joanna Watson examines Scotland’s distinctive higher education regulatory system, its strengths and vulnerabilities, and the growing expectations placed on university governing bodies.
Points raised in this article:
- SFC combines funding, strategy and accountability across tertiary education.
- Scotland’s enhancement model prioritises improvement, partnership and student voice.
- Dundee exposed weaknesses in oversight, challenge and financial governance.
- University boards face sharper expectations on sustainability and assurance.
Scotland’s system of higher education regulation is distinctive. The central regulatory body is the Scottish Funding Council (SFC), a non-departmental public body that combines the roles of funder, strategic planner and accountability authority for the whole tertiary sector. Understanding this architecture, its strengths, its pressure points and the practical expectations it places on university governing bodies is essential for anyone serving on a Scottish university court or board.
The Scottish Funding Council: funder, strategist and accountability body
The SFC’s statutory foundation lies principally in the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005, subsequently amended and strengthened by the Tertiary Education and Training (Funding and Governance) (Scotland) Act 2026. Its core duties include:
- securing the coherent provision of high-quality further and higher education, apprenticeships and work-based learning
- distributing public funding
- holding institutions to account for the delivery of outcomes; promoting research excellence and knowledge exchange
- monitoring institutional sustainability and governance
Unlike the Office for Students in England, which was established as an independent regulator with a primary focus on the interests of students, market entry and exit, and risk-based conditions of registration, the SFC has always been a funding council with teeth. It allocates the bulk of public teaching and research funding for Scottish-domiciled students and for core research.
Because Scottish undergraduates do not pay tuition fees, the SFC’s grant remains a more significant proportion of institutional income than the residual teaching grant in England. This funding relationship is the primary lever of accountability.
The formal relationship between the SFC and each higher education institution is set out in a Financial Memorandum. Governing bodies and their designated officers must comply with its terms. Institutions are also expected to have regard to principles of good governance that the SFC considers to constitute good practice, and all funded provision must be of satisfactory quality. The Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016 adds specific statutory requirements around the composition of governing bodies, the role of the senior lay member, and the academic board.
From academic year 2024-25 the SFC replaced the previous Outcome Agreement process with the Outcomes Framework and Assurance Model. The framework sets clear expectations across access, learning and teaching quality, student outcomes, research excellence, knowledge exchange, good governance, financial sustainability and the proper use of public funds. The Assurance Model is the mechanism through which the SFC monitors delivery, engages with institutions and intervenes when necessary. Governing bodies are expected to own institutional performance and to demonstrate proactive risk management, value for money and integrity in decision-making.
Quality: the enhancement tradition
Scotland has long pursued an enhancement-led approach to quality rather than a predominantly threshold or compliance model. The current framework is the Tertiary Quality Enhancement Framework (TQEF), developed jointly by the SFC, institutions, sector agencies and students. External institutional review is undertaken by QAA Scotland through the Tertiary Quality Enhancement Review (TQER). The UK Quality Code remains a key reference point, interpreted within a Scottish enhancement context.
The enhancement tradition is widely regarded as one of the system’s distinctive strengths. It places continuous improvement, student partnership and thematic learning at the centre of quality work. The relatively modest number of Scottish higher education institutions has historically facilitated a more collegial culture than is always possible in larger systems. International observers have noted the strong student voice and the collaborative ethos that this model can sustain.
That said, enhancement is not a substitute for rigorous assurance. The 2025 Targeted Peer Review of the University of Glasgow, which identified systemic risks to academic standards and the quality of the student experience arising from assessment arrangements, prompted the SFC to commission a national review of awarding arrangements across the sector. The episode illustrated both the willingness of the SFC and QAA Scotland to act when concerns arise and the ongoing tension between an enhancement culture and the need for hard minimum standards and consistency.
Critical appraisal: strengths and vulnerabilities
The Scottish model has genuine and frequently praised strengths. The integrated tertiary perspective allows a more coherent view of the post-16 landscape than the sharper separation between higher and further education that characterises England. The SFC’s strategic and system-steering role enables public investment to be linked more explicitly to national priorities around skills, research, fair access and economic development. Core research funding through the Research Excellence Grant provides institutions with valuable flexibility. The enhancement-led quality system has fostered student partnership and continuous improvement in ways that pure threshold regulation often struggles to achieve.
These strengths sit alongside clear vulnerabilities. The most serious recent test of the system’s capacity for early warning and intervention was the financial crisis at the University of Dundee. In late 2024 the university disclosed a substantial projected deficit. The SFC responded by commissioning an independent investigation led by Professor Pamela Gillies. The resulting Gillies Report, published in June 2025, identified poor financial judgement, inadequate management and reporting, weak monitoring of key performance indicators, lack of agility in responding to falling income, and weak governance in relation to financial accountability by the court.
In his analysis for GGi, The anatomy of avoidable failure: governance lessons from Dundee (15 August 2025), Daniel Taylor examined the Gillies Report in detail and drew out the wider lessons for university governance. Taylor’s piece makes clear that the primary failures lay inside the institution: the court and executive did not have timely or complete visibility of the deteriorating position, ring-fenced proceeds were used for day-to-day operations, bank covenants were breached without proper disclosure, and a culture that discouraged challenge allowed problems to compound.
At the same time, the episode raised legitimate questions about the effectiveness of the SFC’s routine monitoring. Although the university had submitted the required returns, key risks had not been properly escalated. The subsequent need for significant public support and an unprecedented ministerial direction under section 25 of the 2005 Act underscored the limits of the existing early-warning arrangements.
The Dundee case sits within a broader structural context. SFC analysis shows a substantial real-terms reduction in core teaching and research funding over the past decade. Institutions have become heavily reliant on volatile international student fee income. Many in the sector describe the current funding model as unsustainable. A regulator can set expectations and monitor performance, but it cannot itself close a structural funding gap. This creates a persistent tension: institutions are held accountable for outcomes while operating under financial pressures that the regulatory system has only limited power to relieve.
Questions have also been raised about the SFC’s organisational capacity, particularly as its remit expands under the 2026 Act. Universities Scotland has expressed concern that major organisational change and additional duties are being pursued at a time when the sector itself is under acute financial stress and when the council’s capacity is already stretched. Some political commentators go further, portraying the SFC as part of a wider “quango culture” that exercises significant power over autonomous institutions with limited direct democratic accountability.
What university governing bodies need to know
For members of Scottish university courts and boards the practical implications are clear.
First, the primary relationship is the funding and accountability relationship with the SFC. There is no OfS-style registration regime. Eligibility for public funding, compliance with the Financial Memorandum and delivery against the Outcomes Framework are the central mechanisms of oversight.
Second, governing bodies are expected to own institutional performance. The Outcomes Framework and the Financial Memorandum place explicit responsibility on courts for good governance, proactive risk management, financial sustainability and the integrity of decision-making. The Dundee experience demonstrates the cost of failing to discharge that responsibility with sufficient rigour and challenge.
Third, quality is approached through an enhancement lens, but the SFC and QAA Scotland will intervene when academic standards or the student experience are at material risk. Boards need assurance that internal quality processes are robust and that external review findings are taken seriously.
Fourth, financial sustainability is now under sharper scrutiny. The 2026 Act has strengthened the SFC’s duties and powers in this area, including requirements for institutions to notify the council of potentially serious jeopardy. Boards must ensure that they receive timely, complete and candid financial information and that they are prepared to challenge optimistic narratives.
Fifth, the system remains more collaborative and tertiary in character than the English regulatory model. This creates opportunities for partnership and system-level thinking, but it also means that institutional autonomy operates within a stronger framework of collective expectations and public accountability.
Conclusion
Scotland’s higher education regulatory system is neither a pure funding council nor a pure regulator. It is a hybrid that seeks to combine the allocation of public resource with strategic oversight of a tertiary system and accountability for outcomes. Its enhancement tradition, integrated tertiary perspective and collaborative culture are genuine strengths. Its capacity for early detection of institutional distress, its dependence on an underlying funding settlement that has been under sustained pressure, and the practical limits of its organisational capacity are real vulnerabilities.
The Gillies Report into the University of Dundee and Daniel Taylor’s subsequent analysis provide a stark illustration of what happens when institutional governance fails to match the expectations of the Financial Memorandum and the Outcomes Framework. The lessons are not confined to one university. They speak to the quality of challenge, the completeness of information, the culture of openness and the willingness of governing bodies to confront uncomfortable realities before they become crises.
For boards of Scottish universities, the message is straightforward. The regulatory environment is distinctive, the expectations are explicit, and the consequences of weak governance can be severe. Understanding the SFC, the Outcomes Framework, the enhancement system and the lessons of recent failure is not a matter of compliance theatre. It is a core responsibility of those charged with the stewardship of autonomous institutions that remain heavily dependent on public trust and public funding.