Suspicion is enough

16 September 2026

The Thirlwall Inquiry report is an account of babies who were not protected, of families who were not told the truth, and of a trust that treated suspicion of deliberate harm as something to be managed rather than as a reason to act. This article, by GGi chief executive Professor Andrew Corbett-Nolan, is the first in a series about the key governance lessons for boards from the report.

 

Points raised in this article

- Lady Justice Thirlwall finds a complete failure, at every level, to invoke safeguarding. Suspicion of deliberate harm was enough. Certainty was not required to trigger action.

- The board received no reports on the deaths of babies and children throughout the period under review.

- At the extraordinary board on 14 July 2016, some non-executives asked why the police had not been called. The meeting still did not make that referral.

- At the extraordinary board on 10 January 2017, the inquiry finds that “the executives achieved their aim of misleading the board”.

- Constructive challenge is often misunderstood. It is a critical element of board working as the process by which an executive proposal or report is tested and by which accountability moves from the individual officer to the governing body. Executives who avoid that process risk remaining solely responsible for their own unexamined thinking.

 

Lady Justice Thirlwall’s report, laid before Parliament on 15 September 2026, examines events at the Countess of Chester Hospital between 2015 and 2018. Lucy Letby was later convicted of the murder of seven infants and the attempted murder of seven others. 

The inquiry was not asked to revisit those convictions. It was asked to establish how a member of staff suspected of causing deliberate harm was left in a position to continue working with babies and why the organisation around her did not stop that happening.

The chair’s own summary is the right place to start. There was, she said, “complete failure at all levels to invoke safeguarding procedures at any point.” Looking for clinical explanations for deaths and collapses was not itself wrong. Once there was suspicion that Letby might be causing harm deliberately, safeguarding steps should have been taken. Letby should have been removed from the ward as a neutral act so that the matter could be investigated without further risk to babies. As Lady Thirlwall put it, “No one seems to have thought that safeguarding action is required when a member of staff is suspected of causing deliberate harm. It isn’t necessary to be sure. Suspicion is enough.”

That finding is the centre of the report. Everything that follows in the governance chapters is a description of how an organisation talked itself out of acting on a suspicion.

Responding in the Commons, the Health and Social Care Secretary, Yvette Cooper, put the same point in operational language:

“The point about the safeguarding arrangements that the report identifies is that safeguarding arrangements are not a finding of fact. The safeguarding arrangements are what you do when there is a concern, when there is a suspicion. That is when you have to take safeguarding action in order to put safety first. And that is what we have to be clear about right across not just the NHS but right across all of our services. Safeguarding is about what you do when things are still unknown in order to ensure that you put safety first.”

The executives at the Countess did not apply that test. They treated the consultants’ concerns as a claim that had to be proved, or disproved, before anything protective could be done. They commissioned reviews. They discussed supervision. They worried about fairness to a member of staff and about the reputation of a unit. They did not treat another clinician’s suspicion as a sufficient reason to invoke the arrangements designed for precisely that situation.

Unreasonable inaction

The unreasonableness of the managers’ inaction is sharper once the position of the consultants is stated accurately. They were not required to have watched harm being done, nor to have assembled a case that would meet a criminal standard. Professional duty required them to raise a concern where they suspected that a colleague might be putting patients at risk. Suspicion, honestly held, was enough. 

What they were not entitled to do was to raise that suspicion vexatiously or in bad faith. Had they done so (had the allegation been reckless, malicious, or without any reasonable foundation), they would have been exposed to professional regulation and to internal disciplinary process. That is the control against abuse of safeguarding and of speaking-up arrangements. It already existed. It did not need to be invented by delaying action until the facts were proved.

The managers should have understood both sides of the safeguarding arrangements. A good-faith suspicion from the consultants was a sufficient reason to invoke safeguarding: to treat removal from the unit as a neutral act and to investigate. If the suspicion later proved unfounded, the process itself was the protection for the member of staff concerned. Nothing in that framework required the executive to be sure before they acted. By waiting for a quality of proof that safeguarding does not demand they declined to use a system that already distinguished genuine concern from vexatious accusation. The consultants had done what their professional obligations required. The managers then failed to do what those obligations, and the trust’s own safeguarding duty, required of them.

What the board did not see

The report records a structural fact that should have been obvious to anyone sitting on the board. Deaths of adults were reviewed. Deaths of babies and children were not reported to the board at any stage during the period the inquiry considered. Thirlwall describes this as a serious failure of governance, which no one on the board appears to have noticed. It is also evidence, she says, of a structure that had removed advocacy for children and babies from the board and reduced the standing of paediatrics and neonatology.

When concerns were raised with senior managers in May 2016, including the trust’s safeguarding lead, no safeguarding action followed. Thirlwall is explicit that this was a missed opportunity. Had Letby been removed from the unit then, later deaths and attacks would have been prevented. 

14 July 2016

An extraordinary board was convened on 14 July 2016. By then the consultants’ concerns were known to the executive. Some non-executive directors did what the role requires. James Wilkie asked why it was not appropriate to call the police. Other non-executives asked whether continuous supervision of a nurse was feasible and whether the individual would still have unsupervised access to babies. Dr Ravi Jayaram set out his suspicions and asked that the remarks not be minuted. This should have triggered concerns from the board as it pointed to a questionable culture of mistrust. Thirlwall’s observation is that he should have been reassured by the chair, the chief executive or the medical director. He was not. His discomfort, she finds, was well founded.

The meeting closed without a referral to the police. The chosen course was further review and an approach to the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. The inquiry’s finding is that this delayed the involvement of the police. The college, once engaged, should itself have recognised that the matter required a police referral. It did not do so promptly. The trust had already chosen a path that treated commissioned review as a substitute for safeguarding.

July 2016 therefore matters for two reasons. Whilst there was challenge present in the board room, it did not determine the outcome.

10 January 2017

The second extraordinary board, on 10 January 2017, is treated by the inquiry as a meeting with a predetermined purpose. The executives wanted the board to accept the college report, to support Letby’s return to clinical duties, to keep the neonatal unit at Level 1 and to treat the suspicions as closed.

The conduct of the meeting served that purpose. Papers were not circulated in advance. The college report was tabled in the room and collected afterwards. The board was not given Dr Jane Hawdon’s review, nor her letter stating that she had been unable to carry out the work the college had recommended. Wilkie later said he had been misled; had he seen the confidential college report and the Hawdon letter he would have asked why the police were not being called. Sir Duncan Nichol, the chair, accepted that Wilkie had been misled and that Hawdon’s letter was a critical piece of information.

Thirlwall’s conclusion, at Volume II, paragraph 23.31, is unambiguous:

“In short, the executives achieved their aim of misleading the board.”

That sentence is more than a comment on tone. It is a finding about the design of a board meeting. Concerns raised in the room were deflected or not pursued. The board accepted a position that the documents withheld from it would have made untenable.

The inquiry also records failures of candour toward families and toward the coroner, and what the secretary of state, quoting the report, described as “an exercise in spin to steer away from referral to the police.” Those are not separate narratives. They are the same decision, applied to different audiences: the facts were planned to be released only in the form, and at the time, that the executive judged manageable.

What constructive challenge is for

An executive who declines to submit a difficult judgment to the board is not being decisive. They are declining to have their thinking tested. Groupthink is the inevitable result. So is the belief that a suspicion must be converted into a proof before protective action can be taken. Both are visible in this report. The consultants’ concerns were treated as a problem of industrial relations and reputation. Safeguarding, which exists precisely for when the full facts are not yet known, was not used.

When an executive takes a proposal to the board and the board, having heard the evidence and the challenge, accepts it, two things change. The decision becomes the board’s. The executive is no longer alone with it. Accountability moves. That is the constitutional point of constructive challenge. It is not an obstacle placed in the way of competent managers. It is the discipline that prevents a small group from becoming the sole authors of a course they have not been required to justify.

The Countess executives did the opposite. They managed the information that reached the board. They obtained, in January 2017, the appearance of board support for a course the board had not been equipped to examine. They remained, in substance, solely responsible. The inquiry has now recorded what that responsibility contained.

The primary duty was never to the comfort of those managers. It was to the infants on the unit and to the families who were entitled to honesty. Thirlwall’s report, and the secretary of state’s statement, leave no room for confusion on that point. Safeguarding is what an organisation does when it does not yet know. The Countess waited for a certainty that safeguarding does not require. The board, on the two occasions when it was invited to consider the matter, was not given the material that would have made a different decision likely. That is the governance finding. It is secondary only in the sense that the babies and their families should have, at all times, come first.

The report is at thirlwall.public-inquiry.uk.

Meet the author: Andrew Corbett-Nolan

Chief executive and senior partner

Email: andrew.corbett-nolan@good-governance.org.uk Find out more

Prepared by GGI Development and Research LLP for the Good Governance Institute.

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