Learning from Grenfell
03 September 2026
Governance failures, ethical culture and the lessons for boards.
Points raised in this article
- Critical safety information failed to reach boards and scrutiny.
- Residents’ concerns were marginalised instead of treated as risk intelligence.
- Cost and short-term pressures repeatedly overrode safety.
- Unclear accountability created dangerous gaps in responsibility.
- Boards must own ethical culture, challenge and learning.
On the night of 14 June 2017 a fire that began in a fridge-freezer on the fourth floor of Grenfell Tower in North Kensington became a catastrophe that claimed 72 lives. The Phase 2 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, published in September 2024, makes clear that those deaths were avoidable. They were the product of decades of failure by central government, local authority structures, the Tenant Management Organisation, product manufacturers, certification bodies, contractors and the fire service. The report is a forensic account of how a system designed to protect people instead enabled the cladding of a concrete tower in highly combustible materials and then left residents without an effective means of escape.
For GGi the Inquiry is not only a record of a national tragedy. It is one of the most detailed examinations of governance failure available to public-purpose organisations. The patterns it reveals - suppressed information, weak board oversight, the marginalisation of those most affected, the elevation of cost and reputation over safety, unclear accountabilities, and an ethical vacuum in parts of the supply chain - appear, in different forms, in many of the inquiries and reviews that GGI has studied and supported over the past fifteen years. This article draws out the principal governance lessons and considers what boards and leaders must do if similar failures are to be prevented.
The path to disaster
The Inquiry concluded that the fire was “the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry to look carefully into the danger of incorporating combustible materials into the external walls of high-rise residential buildings and to act on the information available to them.” Warnings stretched back to the Knowsley Heights fire in 1991, the Garnock Court fire in 1999 and the Lakanal House fire in 2009. Large-scale tests in 2001 had shown that aluminium composite material (ACM) panels “burned violently.” Successive governments were aware of the risks. They did not act with urgency. In the years after Lakanal House a deregulatory agenda so dominated departmental thinking that “even matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.”
Manufacturers of the cladding and insulation (Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan) engaged in “systematic dishonesty.” They manipulated testing processes, misrepresented data and misled the market. Certification bodies failed to ensure that their certificates were accurate. In the refurbishment itself there was an “unedifying merry-go-round of buck-passing” among the architect, principal contractor and cladding sub-contractor. No one accepted clear responsibility for ensuring that the materials chosen were safe. The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) that managed the tower on behalf of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea was poorly run, maintained a toxic relationship with residents, and failed in basic fire-safety obligations. Information that should have reached the TMO board and the council was withheld.
Core governance failures
1. Failure of board and organisational oversight
Effective governance depends on the board receiving accurate, timely and complete information about risk. At Grenfell that channel was broken. The chief executive of the TMO consistently failed to inform the board or the council’s scrutiny committees of serious fire-safety concerns raised by the London Fire Brigade, including the possibility of criminal proceedings and deficiency notices. The Inquiry found an “entrenched reluctance” to escalate matters that affected fire safety. The systems for reporting existed on paper; in practice they were defeated by individual decisions about what the board needed to know.
This is a classic governance failure. Boards cannot exercise constructive challenge or hold executives to account if critical information is filtered or withheld. GGi’s work across health, local government and housing repeatedly encounters the same pattern: executives who manage the narrative rather than surface risk, and boards that accept reassurance without sufficient curiosity. The lesson is unambiguous. Boards must insist on direct lines of sight into safety-critical issues, protect the independence of internal and external assurance, and treat the suppression of bad news as a serious breach of duty.
2. The silencing of stakeholder voice
Residents of Grenfell Tower raised repeated concerns about fire safety and the quality of the refurbishment. They were dismissed as “militant troublemakers.” The relationship between the TMO and the community deteriorated into mistrust and antagonism. The Inquiry found that the TMO showed “persistent indifference” to fire safety and to the needs of vulnerable residents. Listening was treated as optional rather than a core obligation of stewardship.
GGi has long argued that public purpose organisations exist to serve people, not the other way round. Stakeholder engagement is not a public-relations exercise; it is a primary source of intelligence about risk and performance. When those most affected are marginalised, boards lose their early-warning system. The Grenfell experience demonstrates the lethal consequences of treating resident or patient or service-user voice as noise to be managed rather than signal to be acted upon. Boards must create and protect channels through which uncomfortable truths can reach them, and they must demonstrate that those truths change decisions.
3. Short-termism, cost and deregulation over safety
Cost considerations repeatedly trumped safety. Cheaper combustible cladding was preferred over the original non-combustible specification. A deregulatory climate in government discouraged the strengthening of standards even when the evidence of danger was clear. The result was a system in which the long-term risk to human life was discounted in favour of immediate financial or political convenience.
This is the antithesis of the outcomes-based, sustainable governance that GGi advocates and that underpins the King Committee reports on which GGi relies as our intellectual and ethical underpinning. Boards exist to protect the long-term health of the organisation and the interests of those it serves. When short-term financial or reputational pressures dominate, the board has failed in its fundamental duty. Safety, quality and ethical standards cannot be treated as residual items after cost has been minimised.
4. Unclear accountabilities and the merry-go-round of buck-passing
In the design and construction phase of Grenfell no one accepted clear responsibility for the safety of the external wall system. Architect, contractor and sub-contractor each assumed that someone else was ensuring compliance. The Inquiry described an “unedifying merry-go-round of buck-passing.” Fragmented responsibilities, combined with commercial incentives and weak oversight, produced a collective failure in which individual actors could claim they were not primarily at fault.
Good governance requires crystal-clear accountabilities. Boards must ensure that roles, responsibilities and decision rights are explicit, understood and enforced. Where multiple organisations or professional disciplines are involved, the board must satisfy itself that the interfaces are managed and that no critical function falls between the gaps. Ambiguity is not neutral; it is a risk.
5. Ethical culture and the corrosion of honesty
The most damning findings concern deliberate dishonesty by manufacturers who knew their products were dangerous yet continued to market them for high-rise use. Certification bodies failed to police the claims. Within the TMO and parts of the public sector there was defensiveness, complacency and a reluctance to confront uncomfortable truths. Culture - the shared assumptions about what is acceptable - proved decisive.
GGi has consistently argued that governance is not a morally neutral activity. Boards set the ethical tone. They decide whether the organisation prioritises candour or reputation management, whether it rewards those who surface problems or those who keep the lid on them, and whether safety and honesty are non-negotiable or contingent. The Grenfell Inquiry shows what happens when ethical culture collapses or is never established. Technical controls and compliance systems cannot compensate for a culture that tolerates or incentivises the concealment of risk.
Practical lessons for boards
The Grenfell findings translate into a set of concrete expectations for any board responsible for public safety or public services.
Demand unfiltered information on safety-critical risk. Boards should receive direct assurance from independent sources – internal audit, external regulators, safety specialists – and should treat any attempt to manage or delay bad news as a red flag. The chief executive’s role includes an explicit duty to ensure the board knows what it needs to know.
Protect and amplify the voice of those most affected. Resident, patient, tenant or service-user insight must reach the board in authentic form. Boards should test whether engagement mechanisms are genuine or performative, and whether concerns raised by the vulnerable are systematically tracked to resolution.
Make ethical culture a standing board responsibility. Culture cannot be delegated entirely to the executive. Boards should receive regular, evidence-based reports on speaking-up arrangements, the handling of concerns, and the lived experience of staff and service users. They should ask hard questions about whether the organisation’s stated values are reflected in everyday decisions.
Clarify accountabilities and close the gaps. In complex delivery systems the board must map who is responsible for what, identify interfaces and single points of failure, and ensure that no critical safety function relies on assumptions about someone else’s role.
Resist short-term pressures that compromise long-term safety. Cost reduction, speed of delivery and reputational considerations are legitimate concerns, but they must not override the duty to protect life and health. Boards should require explicit safety impact assessments for major decisions and should be prepared to slow or stop projects when residual risk is unacceptable.
Treat learning as a governance obligation. Inquiries and serious incidents generate recommendations that are too often recorded and then forgotten. Boards should maintain a visible, publicly accountable system for tracking the implementation of recommendations from inquiries, coroners, regulators and internal reviews, and should report progress transparently.
Why this matters to the work of GGi
The Grenfell Inquiry confirms themes that have run through GGi’s work since its foundation in 2009. Governance is the means by which organisations remain true to their purpose under pressure. It requires independent challenge, ethical leadership, genuine stakeholder engagement, clear accountabilities and a relentless focus on outcomes that matter to the people served. When these elements are absent or corrupted, the results can be catastrophic.
The Institute’s emphasis on outcomes-based governance, drawn from the intellectual tradition of the King Committee reports, finds a stark illustration here. Value is not created by minimising short-term cost if the result is the erosion of safety and trust. The insistence that directors act as the conscience of the organisation is not rhetorical; it is a practical necessity. The call for boards to listen to stakeholders and to integrate financial and non-financial considerations is not an optional refinement; it is a safeguard against the very failures that Grenfell exposed.
Across health, local government, housing and the wider public sector, boards face analogous pressures: financial constraint, complex delivery chains, political expectations, and the temptation to manage reputation rather than confront risk. The Grenfell findings should be required reading for every chair, every non-executive and every senior leader who carries responsibility for the safety and well-being of others.
Conclusion
The Grenfell Tower fire was not an unforeseeable accident. It was the predictable result of a system in which warnings were ignored, information was withheld, residents were dismissed, responsibilities were diffused, and commercial and political incentives outweighed the duty to protect life. The Inquiry has laid those failures bare. The remaining question is whether boards and leaders will treat the report as a historical document or as a mirror.
Good governance cannot guarantee that nothing will ever go wrong. It can, however, make it far more difficult for known risks to be ignored, for critical information to be suppressed, and for the voices of the vulnerable to be silenced. That is the standard against which every board should now measure itself. The 72 people who died at Grenfell deserve nothing less than a sustained determination that such a failure of stewardship will not be repeated.
Key learning points
- The Grenfell Tower Inquiry found that 72 deaths were avoidable and resulted from decades of failure across government, industry, local authority structures and the management organisation.
- Critical information about fire-safety risk was withheld from the TMO board and from council scrutiny, defeating formal reporting systems.
- Residents who raised safety concerns were marginalised; the relationship between the management organisation and the community became toxic.
- Cost considerations and a deregulatory climate repeatedly overrode safety; cheaper combustible materials were preferred despite known risks.
- Accountabilities for the safety of the external wall system were unclear, producing a “merry-go-round of buck-passing.”
- Manufacturers engaged in systematic dishonesty; certification bodies failed to ensure the accuracy of product claims.
- Boards must insist on unfiltered information on safety-critical risk and treat the suppression of bad news as a serious breach.
- Stakeholder voice, especially from those most affected, is a primary source of risk intelligence and must be protected and acted upon.
- Ethical culture is a core board responsibility; technical controls cannot compensate for a culture that tolerates the concealment of risk.
- Clear accountabilities and the explicit management of interfaces are essential in complex delivery systems.
- Short-term cost and speed pressures must not override the long-term duty to protect life and health.
- Boards should maintain transparent systems for tracking and implementing recommendations from inquiries and serious incidents.