Asbestos - an accountability every board needs to understand

07 September 2026

Andrew Corbett-Nolan explains asbestos governance, legal dutyholder responsibilities, board accountability and what effective asbestos assurance should look like.

 

Points raised in this article:

  • The organisation remains the legal asbestos dutyholder. 
  • Appointing an asbestos lead does not transfer accountability. 
  • Competence, succession and board visibility are critical controls. 
  • Asbestos plans must actively govern work, not just exist on paper. 
  • Boards need assurance on real exposure and residual risk.

 

GGi carries out multiple investigations into asbestos governance. Boards cannot subcontract accountability for asbestos to a lone appointed person. The legal duty stays with the organisation. What fails, and what GGi sees investigation after investigation, is not the absence of a register. It is the isolation of the person asked to live with it.

Asbestos in the NHS and other public-purpose organisations is usually treated as an estates’ compliance issue. It is not. It is a test of whether the board knows who holds the legal duty in every building the organisation occupies, whether the management plan actually governs work on the fabric, and whether anyone other than one specialist, often tired, often isolated, could describe the residual risk of harm.

GGi is repeatedly asked to look at asbestos governance when something has already gone wrong. The pattern is depressingly consistent. This article sets out that pattern, and the accountabilities that public-purpose boards almost invariably underestimate.

 

The UK asbestos problem

Asbestos is a group of naturally occurring mineral fibres used for most of the twentieth century because they were cheap, strong and resistant to heat and fire. In hospitals and other public buildings they went into insulation, ceiling and floor tiles, partition boards, pipe lagging, boilers, ducts and a long list of fittings that remain in buildings constructed or refurbished before the 1999 ban. The fibres are dangerous when they become airborne and are inhaled. They can cause mesothelioma, lung cancer, asbestosis and other pleural disease — illnesses that often appear only after 20 or even 40 years. That is why today’s exposure becomes tomorrow’s death certificate, and why official statistics still record thousands of asbestos-related deaths in Great Britain each year. There is no agreed safe level of exposure. The typical risk is not a dramatic cloud of dust in a public corridor. It is the quiet disturbance of old fabric: a contractor opening a riser, a leaking pipe, a rushed small works job, a ceiling tile moved on a night shift. That is why asbestos is a governance problem as well as a materials problem. The harm is slow, the public estate is full of it, and the people who will become ill are often not in the room when the management plan is nodded through.

Great Britain does not have a national programme to strip asbestos from the public estate by a set date. The framework is the Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012 (CAR 2012), enforced by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in England, Scotland and Wales. New use of asbestos was banned in 1999. What remains is a duty to manage the legacy: find asbestos-containing materials (ACMs), assess their condition, keep a living plan and register, tell anyone who may disturb them, and remove or encapsulate when the material is damaged or when works will disturb it. If it is sound and unlikely to be disturbed, official policy is still to manage it in situ and to keep any exposure as low as reasonably practicable. In 2022 the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee argued that this approach was not sustainable and called for a 40-year removal deadline and a central register. The government rejected the deadline, on the grounds that a forced timetable could increase exposure, and has instead pursued inspection campaigns, research and targeted tightening of the regulations. HSE’s more recent language of a “pathway to safely remove asbestos from workplaces” is a shift in tone. It is not yet a funded eradication programme for hospitals.

The legal duty is the same in Scotland and Wales as in England. What differs is the system in which boards must discharge it. English NHS trusts sit in a commissioner–provider landscape, under CQC well-led scrutiny, with a national RAAC programme and New Hospital Programme that will often be the practical trigger for removal. Scottish territorial boards and Welsh health boards are integrated bodies, closer to government, with their own capital and technical arrangements — in Scotland, for example, through NHSScotland Assure — and with governance frameworks (Scotland’s Blueprint for Good Governance; in Wales, the Well-being of Future Generations Act) that make long-horizon stewardship a statutory expectation rather than an optional essay. None of that changes who the dutyholder is. It does change how a board should join asbestos to estate strategy, ministerial accountability and the question of who is being kept safe decades from now. Northern Ireland operates a parallel regime under the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland. It is not CAR 2012, but the governance failure mode is familiar.

 

Who the dutyholder is — and is not

CAR 2012 places the duty to manage asbestos in non-domestic premises on the dutyholder. That is every person who, by contract or tenancy, has an obligation to maintain or repair the premises; or, where there is no such contract, every person who has control of them. Where more than one party has a maintenance obligation, there can be more than one dutyholder.

For most hospitals, HSE’s position is that the dutyholder is the employer. The employer is the NHS body — the trust, foundation trust or health board — not the board as a collection of directors, and not the chief executive personally. The organisation is the dutyholder. The board governs how that organisation discharges the duty. The chief executive carries overall executive accountability for doing so. An appointed lead runs the system day to day. None of those people becomes the Regulation 4 dutyholder by being named.

Delegation is essential. Abdication is unlawful. The duty is not transferred when the board appoints an asbestos lead. It stays with the body corporate.

That distinction is not pedantry. It is the point boards miss. Non-executives are not personally named in Regulation 4. They are accountable for an organisation that is. On a PFI site, a leased clinic or a building the organisation occupies but does not repair, another party may be dutyholder, or several parties may share the duty. The board’s first job is to know which is which — not to assume “we own the risk everywhere,” and not to assume “estates owns it, so we do not.”

 

The appointed person is not a substitute for the duty

HSE is explicit about the next step. To make sure ACMs are properly managed, the organisation must identify the person who will be responsible for that management. HSE’s language is responsible or appointed person. That person must be competent. Competence, in HSE’s words, means resources, skills, training and authority. In a large or complex portfolio, HSG264 says an appointed person will be essential, and that dutyholders should identify a deputy in some cases. For an NHS estate, a deputy is not optional good manners. It is how the organisation avoids a single point of failure. The appointed person coordinates surveys, keeps the register alive, runs the management plan, briefs contractors and escalates deterioration. They do not become the dutyholder. The organisation cannot appoint its way out of Regulation 4.

There is no official NHS job title of “asbestos manager,” which is part of the problem. Organisations invent labels. Some appoint a director of estates as “nominated person” and bury the operational work in a compliance manager who also owns fire, water, electricity and medical gases. Some buy an external authorised engineer and assume that is a management system. Some have an excellent appointed person and no idea what they would do if that person were ill on the day a contractor opened a riser.

 

What GGi keeps finding

In investigations GGi has undertaken, the failure mode is drearily consistent.

The appointed person was not properly credentialled, or their training had not been refreshed. A BOHS P405 taken a decade earlier is not, by itself, living competence. Surveying qualifications (typically P402) were confused with management qualifications (typically P405 or equivalent). Awareness courses were treated as enough for the person who must procure licensed contractors and challenge a poor survey.

They were isolated. Asbestos sat in estates, not in the conversation between estates, health and safety, occupational health, capital planning and the committee that thinks it owns risk. The appointed person had information. They did not have a route that made the board hear it.

When they left, there was no handover a successor could use. The register lived in one person’s head, a shared drive and a consultant’s portal. The management plan had not been exercised as a working document. The deputy did not exist, or existed only on an organogram.

And the board was uneducated about the organisation’s accountabilities and unsighted on what was happening. Members could say “we have a policy” and “we are compliant with CAR 2012.” They could not say who the dutyholder was for the PFI block, how many ACMs were overdue for reinspection, or when the management plan last stopped a piece of work. That is not assurance. It is a story the organisation told itself.

This is the same pattern we see in clinical governance committees that drown in process and are starved of outcomes. A forty-page annual health and safety paper that confirms the existence of a register answers the wrong question. The questions that matter are simpler. Is anyone more likely to be exposed this year than last? Would we know? If the appointed person left on Friday, would Monday still be safe?

RAAC — reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete — has forced some of this conversation into the open because collapse is imaginable in a boardroom. Asbestos is quieter. The harm is slow. The buildings are often of the same era. The governance requirement is the same: a named organisational duty, a competent person who is not a single point of failure, a plan that is used, and a board that can describe residual risk without reaching for the appendix.

HSE’s framework remains: find it, assess it, manage it, tell people who might disturb it, review. “Manage in situ” is a legitimate treatment of risk only if the board has chosen it on behalf of the organisation, resourced the monitoring, and knows which materials would fail that choice. It is not a legitimate treatment if it is simply what happens when capital is short and the appointed person has stopped asking.

What changes the picture is not another policy. It is treating the appointed person as part of the control environment. That means a role description that matches HSE’s test of competence. It means P405 or equivalent for the person who manages the plan — current, refreshed, and distinct from the qualifications of the surveyors they commission. It means a deputy who has actually done the job. It means a handover file that would survive the person: a map of dutyholders by site, where the register lives and how good it is, overdue actions, contractor rules, live works, claims and incidents, and the last date the plan changed a decision. It means the appointed person is heard in the same room as capital, fire, water and RAAC, because disturbing one risk to remediate another is how organisations harm people while meaning well.

Above all it means the board understands that the organisation remains the dutyholder. Non-executives do not need to read HSG264. They do need to know that “we have an asbestos manager” is not assurance. Assurance is whether the system would still work if that person were not there, and whether the residual risk on the board assurance framework describes exposure and control — or merely the existence of paperwork.

Stewardship, in Mervyn King’s sense, is about duties to people who are not in the room, including people who have not yet been born. Estates in general, and asbestos in particular, are a forty-year conversation with those people. Boards that leave it to an isolated appointed person are not delegating. They are hoping.

 

Board checklist: asbestos as a well-led duty

Use this in audit and risk, health and safety, or as a well-led deep dive. A “yes” is only a yes if evidence can be produced in the meeting.

 

1. Duty and ownership

  • For every building we occupy (owned, leased, PFI, occupied clinic, communal parts of staff residences), can we name the legal dutyholder and point to the lease or contract that says so?
  • Where we are not the dutyholder, is there a written cooperation arrangement, access to their register and plan, and an escalation route if they fail?
  • Does the chief executive accept, in writing, overall executive accountability for how the organisation discharges its duty as dutyholder?
  • Is a board-level nominated executive (usually estates/facilities) named, and do they understand they have not taken the statutory duty off the organisation?

 

2. The appointed person is a system

  • Is there a named appointed person and a named deputy, both with time in their job plans?
  • Does their role description include HSE’s four tests: resources, skills, training and authority to stop work?
  • Are they isolated in estates, or do they have a standing route into health and safety, occupational health, capital planning and the relevant committee?
  • If they left on Friday, is there a handover pack that a successor could use on Monday?

 

3. Credentials and competence

  • Does the appointed person hold a current management qualification appropriate to the role (typically BOHS P405or equivalent), not only asbestos awareness or a surveying ticket (P402)?
  • Is there a refresh cycle, and is it overdue?
  • Are surveyors, analysts and licensed contractors procured against competence (qualification plus supervised experience plus accreditation), not against a logo on a framework?
  • Has anyone confused “we trained the maintenance team” with “the person who runs the plan is competent”?

 

4. A plan that is used

  • Is there a written asbestos management plan that is reviewed at least annually and after incidents or major works?
  • When did the plan last change a decision — stop a contractor, alter a decant, force a refurbishment survey?
  • How many known or presumed ACMs are overdue for reinspection, and is that number falling?
  • Can a night-time emergency contractor see location and condition data before they cut?

 

5. Control of work that disturbs the fabric

  • Is permit-to-work / contractor control wired to the register, including small works and “just popping a tile”?
  • Are refurbishment and demolition surveys commissioned before projects, not after the first surprise?
  • Do fire, RAAC, backlog and asbestos plans talk to each other so one remediation does not create another exposure?
  • What training and permit failures have there been in the last twelve months, and what changed as a result?

 

6. Sighted assurance, not a compliant story

  • Does the BAF or corporate risk register describe exposure and control, or only “risk of non-compliance with CAR 2012”?
  • Does the committee receive a one-page trajectory (overdue inspections, damaged ACMs, contractor breaches, incidents, claims, vacancies in the appointed-person role) rather than an annual novella?
  • Have non-executives had a short, serious briefing on the organisation’s duty — not a toolbox talk?
  • If HSE inspected next month, what would they find that we already know and have not fixed?

 

7. Continuity and learning

  • Is succession for the appointed person on the same footing as other single points of failure (responsible person for fire, authorised engineer, Caldicott guardian)?
  • After the last departure in the role, was the handover audited, or only assumed?
  • Are incidents, near misses, staff concerns and civil claims triangulated with the register, or held in separate drawers?
  • Has the board stated an explicit risk appetite for manage-in-situ versus removal, with the capital consequences attached?

 

If the board cannot answer these without calling the appointed person in from the corridor, the organisation does not have an asbestos management system. It has a person. That is the finding GGi’s investigations keep making.

 

Sources

Law and official guidance

  • The Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/632), especially regulation 4 (duty to manage asbestos in non-domestic premises).
  • Health and Safety Executive, Managing and working with asbestos. Control of Asbestos Regulations 2012. Approved Code of Practice and guidance (L143).
  • Health and Safety Executive, The duty to manage asbestos in buildings, including the requirement to identify a responsible or appointed person with resources, skills, training and authority.
  • Health and Safety Executive, Asbestos: The survey guide (HSG264), including the appointed person and, in some cases, a deputy.
  • Health and Safety Executive, Introduction to asbestos safety; Asbestos information, instruction and training.
  • Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

 

Competence and qualifications

  • British Occupational Hygiene Society, P405 Management of Asbestos in Buildings (including Asbestos Removal)and RP405 refresher.
  • British Occupational Hygiene Society, P402 Surveying and Sampling Strategies for Asbestos in Buildings.

 

UK policy and parliamentary context

  • House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, The Health and Safety Executive’s approach to asbestos management, Sixth Report of Session 2021–22 (April 2022).
  • Work and Pensions Committee, Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2021–22 (July 2022).
  • Health and Safety Executive, consultation on legislative and guidance proposals for CAR 2012 (November 2025–January 2026).
  • Health and Safety Executive, policy position and review of Great Britain’s asbestos control limit (December 2025 / published May 2026).
  • Health and Safety Executive Business Plan 2026 to 2027.
  • Health and Safety Executive statistical releases on asbestos-related disease in Great Britain.

 

NHS, schools and the four nations

  • Department for Education, Managing asbestos in your school or college (England).
  • Welsh Government, Asbestos management in schools.
  • Health and Safety Executive, asbestos checklist for schools.
  • NHS England / DHSC material on the national RAAC programme and the New Hospital Programme (England).
  • NHSScotland Assure / Scottish Health Technical Notes on estate and RAAC management.
  • Scottish Government, A Blueprint for Good Governance in NHS Scotland.
  • Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.
  • Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland — parallel regime outside CAR 2012.

 

GGi context

  • GGi insights on clinical governance, assurance and well-led practice.
  • King IV / King V — stewardship for people not in the room.

Meet the author: Andrew Corbett-Nolan

Chief executive and senior partner

Email: andrew.corbett-nolan@good-governance.org.uk Find out more

Prepared by GGI Development and Research LLP for the Good Governance Institute.

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