What does ICB restructuring mean for governance? Lessons from the NAO
09 November 2026
Simon Hall highlights six governance lessons from last week’s National Audit Office report and from our work with integrated care boards
Points raised
- Restructuring is measured by savings, not by intended benefits.
- Smaller integrated care boards face broader, more demanding commissioning roles.
- Delegation changes how accountability works but never removes it.
- Losing experienced staff erodes knowledge that savings plans ignore.
It is difficult not to feel some sympathy for integrated care boards (ICBs). Over the past couple of years, I have worked with several of them, including an organisation emerging through merger. Each has been trying to establish a clear purpose, build relationships and create governance arrangements suited to its local system. Just as a degree of stability comes into view, another reduction in running costs, transfer of responsibilities or proposed boundary change arrives over the horizon. Stability, it seems, is always scheduled for next year.
The National Audit Office (NAO) report Restructuring of Integrated Care Boards, published on 4 November, provides a sober account of this latest phase. ICBs have responded at pace. Most have developed new operating models, extensive workforce reductions are under way, and 42 ICBs have already become 25 ICBs or clusters. The NAO's central concern is that the reforms have moved faster than some of the arrangements needed to make them work.
There is a striking imbalance in the assurance available nationally. We know a great deal about running costs, headcount, redundancies and organisational configurations. We know much less about whether reformed ICBs will retain the capability, relationships and information needed to improve population health and reduce inequalities. The process of restructuring is measurable. Its intended benefits remain much harder to see.
A commissioner in a more nuanced sense
The future ICB is still a commissioner, although not quite in the sense in which the word has often been used in the NHS. It is not intended to be another operational headquarters, sitting above providers and duplicating performance management already undertaken elsewhere. Nor should it become the meeting place to which every problem crossing an organisational boundary is escalated.
Its role is both narrower and more demanding. ICBs are expected to understand population needs and inequalities, set longer-term priorities and outcomes, allocate resources, shape a sustainable provider landscape, contract for services, and evaluate whether investment is producing the intended impact. They must do this in partnership with local government, providers and communities, while remaining accountable for value from very substantial public budgets.
This is strategic commissioning rather than simply buying services. It requires an ICB to make judgements about where resources should move, which services need to change and, inevitably, which activities should stop. A smaller organisation may spend less time monitoring the operational performance of individual providers, yet it will need much better intelligence about the health of its population and the combined effect of the services it commissions.
The responsibilities are also expanding. From April 2027, subject to legislation, ICBs are expected to assume statutory responsibility for areas including vaccination, screening, child health information, health and justice, sexual assault and abuse services, primary care and specified specialised services. Some of these functions are already delegated, but the transfer of statutory accountability still matters. The apparent paradox is that ICBs are being made considerably smaller while their commissioning role becomes broader and more technically demanding.
Commissioning closer to delivery
A strategic commissioner does not need to design every pathway from the centre. Much of that work can – and often should – take place closer to the people using services. Neighbourhood teams can shape care around local population needs. Place partnerships can connect the NHS with councils, public health and voluntary organisations. Provider collaboratives can redesign pathways across organisational boundaries and make better use of clinical and operational knowledge.
Some provider arrangements will increasingly undertake activities that look remarkably like commissioning: analysing need, agreeing service models, allocating resources between partners, coordinating pathways and subcontracting delivery. This may be entirely sensible. A remote ICB cannot reproduce the knowledge held within primary care, community services, councils and local voluntary organisations.
The governance question is therefore not whether every commissioning activity must remain inside the ICB. It is what can safely be delegated, to whom, and with what accountability. The statutory commissioner must still establish the outcomes required, ensure resources are allocated fairly, manage conflicts of interest, protect appropriate choice, address failure and evaluate impact. Delegation changes the way accountability is exercised; it does not make accountability disappear.
The answer to an ICB becoming more strategic cannot be to move operational complexity elsewhere and call the resulting arrangement a partnership. Provider collaboratives need real authority if they are to deliver change, but that authority must be matched by transparent decision rights, agreed limits and meaningful assurance. Otherwise, the system risks creating an elaborate middle ground in which everyone influences a decision and nobody is quite accountable for it.
Neighbourhood governance before neighbourhood structures
The same principle applies to neighbourhood health. Neighbourhoods should not become another level on the NHS organogram. Their purpose is to bring decisions closer to communities, join up care and create the conditions for prevention. Governance should follow that purpose rather than begin with a standard committee structure.
This raises some deceptively simple questions. Which decisions genuinely belong at neighbourhood level? What resources accompany them? Who holds contracts and employs staff? How are primary care, local government and community organisations involved? Who is accountable when several providers contribute to the same outcome? What information returns to the ICB, and what should trigger intervention?
There also needs to be room for local difference. Neighbourhoods will not all begin from the same point or require identical models. The ICB's task is not to insist on uniformity, but neither can it allow subsidiarity to become abandonment. It must know whether different arrangements are collectively improving access, outcomes and inequalities, and be prepared to act when they are not.
The costs that do mot appear in the savings plan
The NAO records that local authorities have already experienced the consequences of ICB workforce instability. The loss of experienced staff has delayed programmes, weakened joint commissioning and placed additional pressure on councils and providers. This illustrates a wider point: removing a function from one organisation does not remove the need for that function. It may simply move the work, cost or risk somewhere less visible.
Organisational memory is especially difficult to count. Experienced commissioners know why a service developed in a particular way, where relationships are fragile, which apparent solutions have failed before and what is required to bring partners with them. That knowledge does not sit neatly in a database or scheme of delegation. A restructuring programme that counts departing posts but not departing knowledge is not measuring its full cost.
Relationships deserve similar attention. Strategic commissioning operates through influence as much as hierarchy. Effective relationships with councils, providers, primary care and communities are therefore part of an ICB's capability, not a pleasant addition to it. Boards should treat disruption to these relationships as a material transition risk.
Governing through repeated transition
Several governance lessons emerge from the NAO report and from work with ICBs navigating these changes:
- Purpose must come before structure. Boards need a shared account of what the ICB exists to do before settling portfolios, committees and reporting lines. An elegant structure cannot compensate for an unresolved purpose.
- Decision rights must be explicit. The boundaries between the ICB, the NHS England region, provider collaboratives, place and neighbourhood cannot be sustained by goodwill alone. Each needs to know which decisions it owns, which it influences and which it must assure.
- Assurance must follow delegation. Delegated responsibility should be accompanied by clear outcomes, proportionate information, escalation thresholds and arrangements for intervention. A partnership meeting is not, by itself, an assurance system.
- Capability needs board-level attention. Boards should understand which commissioning, analytical, clinical and relational capabilities are being retained, lost, shared or purchased. Assurance that the workforce plan balances is not assurance that the operating model can work.
- Benefits must extend beyond savings. The board should be able to show how restructuring improves commissioning, outcomes, inequalities and public value. These measures may be more difficult than counting posts, but they are the reason for undertaking the reform.
- Governance must become more purposeful. A leaner ICB cannot sustain every inherited meeting, report and assurance process. Fewer arrangements will need to be clearer about the decisions they support and the assurance they provide.
A more demanding form of commissioning
The decisive question is not how many people an ICB employs or how impressive its new organogram appears. It is whether the organisation can make better choices about the health of its population and create the conditions in which neighbourhoods and providers can act effectively.
The future ICB will probably be smaller, more strategic and less involved in operational management. That does not make its governance task easier. It must commission through relationships and influence, delegate without losing accountability, tolerate local variation without accepting inequity, and judge whether activity across a complex system is producing better outcomes.
ICBs have absorbed a remarkable amount of structural change in a short period. The next phase should give them something they have rarely enjoyed: sufficient clarity and stability to become good at the role now being asked of them. Otherwise, the NHS risks creating leaner commissioners that can describe their responsibilities perfectly well but no longer possess the capability to discharge them.