The three narratives of board assurance
08 September 2026
Guest blogger Professor Chris Harrison explains why ‘I can provide more detail’ is the wrong answer
Points raised in this article:
- Board reports often confuse management activity with genuine assurance
- Naive and defensive narratives describe progress without proving impact
- Assurance narratives show outcomes, residual risks and missing evidence
- Non-executives should keep asking: “How do we know?”
One of the most common misunderstandings I’ve seen in board and committee meetings is when a non-executive asks for assurance, and an executive responds with a description of activities and an offer of more detail.
It goes like this:
NED: "How do we know the intervention is working?"
Exec director: "We have arranged a meeting next Tuesday, and I'm happy to provide more detail."
At that point, as committee chair, I just have to intervene and remind us all that descriptions of management activity and more excruciating detail are not what we need.
We often hear lengthy descriptions of what meetings are planned or have taken place, who chairs the programme board, how many workstreams have been established, who has spoken to whom, and who hasn’t replied to an email.
All interesting stuff, but Aargh! What I am trying to establish is something much simpler:
- How do we know?
- How do we know patients are safer?
- How do we know culture is improving?
- How do we know the problem that prompted all this activity is actually being addressed?
- Do different sources of information tell the same story?
My recent quick review of publicly available board and committee reports shows they often answer the question, "What have we done?" while leaving unanswered, "How do we know it worked?"
In my experience, executive board reporting falls into three narrative types: naive, defensive and assurance. These are not intended as rigid categories. Many papers contain elements of all three narratives, but one usually predominates.
Distinguishing between them has helped me function better as a board member.
The three narratives
The naive narrative
This is by far the most common.
A naive narrative is not dishonest. People who genuinely believe the organisation is improving usually write it. The difficulty is that the evidence presented is largely evidence of activity.
The paper tells us that:
- a programme has been established
- a steering group has been created
- governance has been strengthened
- oversight meetings are taking place
- workstreams have been launched
- accountability has been clarified
All of these things may be true and important, but they provide a situation report and do not, by themselves, answer the fundamental board questions of whether outcomes have improved and risk has reduced.
The underlying assumption is that activity can be taken as evidence of improvement. It is an understandable assumption, but it is not assurance.
The defensive narrative
A defensive narrative is different and more concerning.
Here, the organisation is under pressure (in the NHS and wider public sector, aren't we all?). We know it well - intense regulator scrutiny, adverse media attention, deteriorating performance or concern from anxious stakeholders. The paper seeks to reassure.
We are told that the direction of travel is “positive”. “Confidence” is growing. “Significant” progress has been made. “Robust” arrangements are now in place. Of these, use of the term “robust” always makes me particularly curious, even downright suspicious. Executive directors take note!
The defensive narrative report focuses heavily on strengths and achievements. Green shoots abound. Risks are acknowledged but often quite vaguely and without quantification. Continuing risks, difficulties or obstacles are described euphemistically, as challenges or dependencies. “We are not where we want to be, but we have a robust plan for recovery.”
This is not necessarily deliberate evasion. Most executives are trying to maintain board and public confidence while also being honest about problems. The result can be a paper and presentation that feels reassuring without actually providing substantial assurance.
The assurance narrative
The third type is what boards should strive for. What NEDs should expect and what EDs should ensure is produced.
It is the least commonly found.
An assurance narrative demonstrates impact. It is not simply a description of activity. It follows a straightforward logic:
- What was the problem?
- What are the standards to which we should be performing?
- What action was taken?
- What evidence shows it worked?
- What risks remain?
- What evidence is still absent?
This type of report is less comfortable to read. It exposes uncertainty and weakness. Paradoxically, it can give boards much greater confidence because it lets directors see reality more clearly and present it all, warts and all.
This matters in practice because boards are responsible for oversight, not management. Their role is not to monitor every action taken but to determine whether risks are understood, controls are effective, and outcomes are improving.
The strongest assurance papers I have read contained the most explicit discussion of residual risk.
Presenting information in this way is a skill to be learned. It does not seem to come naturally to all executives, especially those from professional backgrounds for whom adherence to process and taking action is the hallmark of doing things well.
In thinking about this article, I reviewed a sample of publicly available board and committee papers from NHS organisations. I found examples of all three narratives. I found that reports often described activity in considerable detail while providing relatively little evidence that the underlying problem had actually improved.
Why executives lapse into naive narrative
I do not believe this is primarily a competency or behavioural issue. It stems from how executive leaders experience their work. I know. I was one for three decades, and I certainly made this mistake. Many times.
Executives are judged on delivery. They spend their days establishing programmes, tackling operational problems, allocating resources and driving improvement activity. When asked for an update, it is entirely natural for them to describe what they have done.
From the executive perspective, stronger governance arrangements are themselves evidence of progress. For boards, however, the question is different. We are not asking what has been done; we are asking whether it has worked.
That distinction sounds dead simple, but board reporting often loses it, and it also confuses governance with assurance.
I frequently read, and have in the past written, papers that describe stronger governance arrangements, more meetings, additional scrutiny, and improved reporting structures. These may signal organisational grip. They may even be prerequisites for improvement. But more meetings are not, in themselves, evidence that patients are safer, quality is better or risk has reduced.
Grip is important, but grip is not assurance.
When organisations start believing their own story
One danger with the naive narrative is not that it misleads others but that organisations can begin to mislead themselves. I have seen it in action.
The greatest governance failures we read about in inquiry reports rarely begin with deliberate deception. More often they begin with “sincere optimism”. Evidence of intense activity is taken as a sign things are getting better.
Once a programme has a compelling narrative, visible leadership, regular meetings, and a substantial volume of activity, it can start to feel successful before evidence shows outcomes have improved.
Board papers begin to describe momentum, commitment and engagement. Updates become increasingly positive. The organisation takes comfort from the amount of work being undertaken.
Over time, the organisation becomes increasingly convinced by its own narrative.
Yet patients, service users and staff experience outcomes, not narratives.
Activity is evidence that work is taking place. It is not evidence that improvement is taking place.
Boards therefore have an important role in testing whether evidence or activity is generating confidence.
What can non-executives do?
A non-executive's role is not to become an operational expert. It is to test whether the evidence supports the conclusions.
Here are a few questions that are particularly useful:
- How do we know?
- What evidence would convince us this intervention had failed?
- What outcome measures have changed?
- What independent assurance supports this conclusion?
- What risks remain despite the improvements described?
- If we repeated the inspection tomorrow, what would still concern us?
By asking these or similar questions, non-executives can help move the discussion from activity to impact.
They help distinguish evidence from aspiration and guide executives and senior managers away from the naive narrative towards an assurance narrative.
A simple test
When reading a board or committee paper, I mentally remove the adjectives.
Words such as:
- strengthened
- improved
- enhanced
- robust
- comprehensive
- effective
- positive
I then ask myself what evidence remains and whether, without these words, the paper would still provide assurance.
If the answer is no, the proposed assurance is resting more on narrative than evidence. What remains is likely a naive or defensive narrative rather than an assurance narrative.
A challenge for boards
Boards need stories. Organisations improve through leadership, purpose, and collective effort. Narrative plays an important role in understanding.
But danger lurks when narrative becomes a substitute for assurance.
Every board receives reports filled with activity, structures and positive language. Good boards learn to keep asking: How do we know?
Unless that question has a convincing answer based on evidence rather than assertion or description, what we have may be a persuasive narrative. It may even be an accurate narrative.
But it is not assurance.
Final thought
The question I try to ask as a committee chair and non-executive, is: If all the meetings, programmes, workstreams, and governance structures were removed from this paper, would there still be enough evidence for me to report to the board that outcomes had improved, and risks had reduced?
If not, the committee has received a situation report. It has not received assurance.
Professor Chris Harrison is vice-chair and a non-executive director at the Northern Care Alliance NHS Foundation Trust, and a non-executive director at University Hospitals of Derby and Burton NHS Foundation Trust, where he chairs both organisations’ quality committees. He also serves as a board adviser at The Christie NHS Foundation Trust. His 48-year full-time NHS career spanned senior roles in clinical medicine, public health, commissioning, system leadership, trust leadership and as a national clinical director.
This blog originally appeared on Chris Harrison's Substack.