Rethinking academic governance

Senior consultant Daniel Taylor suggests the time is ripe to reimagine the role of university senates

The UK higher education sector stands at a crossroads. As universities contend with deepening financial pressures, intensified regulatory oversight, and rising public and political scrutiny, there is renewed urgency to examine whether their internal governance systems are truly fit for purpose. At the heart of this lies a critical, often overlooked body: the university senate or academic board.

Historically revered as the ‘sovereign academic body’, the senate has in many institutions become largely ceremonial, disconnected from the serious work of governance and increasingly peripheral to institutional strategy. Yet if universities are to uphold academic integrity while navigating external demands, the role of the senate must be reasserted, not nostalgically, but structurally.

It must evolve into a modern oversight body, capable of holding the academic executive to account, providing credible assurance to governing bodies, and stewarding the academic mission of the university in a time of unprecedented challenge.

Historical role and evolution

University senates have evolved significantly. Traditionally, they were the central governing bodies of academic life – large deliberative assemblies made up of senior academics, entrusted with setting curricula, upholding standards, and preserving the intellectual mission of the institution. In many older, research-intensive universities, this historic model persists, at least in form.

However, in more modern or post-1992 universities, the equivalent body is often termed an academic board, and tends to have a smaller, more functionally focused remit. These boards are often concerned primarily with academic quality assurance, validation, and regulatory compliance, with less emphasis on strategy, scrutiny, or wide academic debate. This narrowing of scope reflects broader trends toward managerialism and a more centralised executive approach to governance.

Despite these differences in name and function, both senates and academic boards are formally constituted bodies within university governance frameworks. Their powers are typically defined in statutes, ordinances, or Articles of Government, giving them a legal and institutional basis that is distinct from ad hoc committees or advisory groups.

This status is important – it means they are not optional or ornamental; they have formal responsibilities, often including academic strategy, standards, and oversight of compliance with regulatory frameworks like those set by the OfS. However, there is variation in how these bodies relate to the university’s governing body. In some institutions, senate is explicitly described as a committee of council, implying a delegated responsibility and a reporting line that reinforces council’s ultimate authority. In others, senate exists in parallel to council, exercising autonomous academic authority. This divergence reflects deeper questions about where academic accountability resides, and raises critical issues about the balance of power, independence, and assurance in university governance.

The divergence in powers and nomenclature between ‘senate’ and ‘academic board’ matters, particularly in relation to external assurance (e.g. Office for Students expectations) and the increasing importance of visible academic governance to stakeholders, students, and regulators. The inconsistency in terminology and remit also matters; it can confuse students, regulators, and stakeholders about where academic accountability truly sits, and undermines the visibility of academic governance at a time when assurance and transparency are under heightened scrutiny.

The governance gap: who holds the academic executive to account?

University governance typically rests on three pillars: the council (with legal responsibility), the executive (with operational power), and the senate (with academic authority). But while council receives formal assurance, and the executive wields day-to-day control, the position of senate is ambiguous. Many senates are defined in statutes as sovereign, yet in practice they often lack the tools, voice, or even the chairing arrangements to assert that sovereignty.

We are left with a simple but critical governance question: who holds the academic executive to account?

If the vice-chancellor or deputy vice-chancellor leads on academic performance, quality, standards and regulatory compliance, and if council lacks the academic expertise to challenge in detail, then surely senate must occupy this role. Yet in many institutions, this accountability function is under-developed or avoided entirely.

This gap in oversight is not just theoretical: under the Office for Students’ Condition E2, providers must demonstrate adequate and effective governance. Where council lacks detailed academic understanding, a weak or passive senate creates a blind spot in assurance.

Accountability vs authority: clarifying the language

Much of the discomfort around senate’s role stems from a lack of clarity over what accountability means. Accountability is not opposition; it is not a power struggle. Rather, it is the mechanism through which those in authority (e.g., the academic executive) are required to explain and justify their actions and performance — and be held to consequences where appropriate.

If senate is the academic sovereign body, with authority over standards and strategy, then accountability must flow back to it. A Senate that sets academic direction but is not empowered to hold the executive to account on its delivery is an illusion. Authority without accountability is hollow.

This is not a mere semantic distinction. It has deep implications for how we construct our governance frameworks.

Should senate be an oversight body?

There is an important provocation here: if senate is charged (often explicitly in statute or ordinance) with maintaining academic standards, approving strategy, and monitoring compliance with regulatory requirements (such as the OfS conditions), then it must necessarily perform an oversight function. Whether we use the term or not, the function exists. In that case, the right questions to ask are:

• Does Senate have the information it needs to scrutinise academic performance?
• Does it have the power to intervene, reject, or revise proposals from the executive?
• Does it have the independence to perform this role credibly?

In many universities, the answer to all these questions is ‘no’. That is a governance weakness, not just a cultural quirk. Oversight need not mean veto or obstruction, it means structured scrutiny, informed challenge, and transparent assurance. These are hallmarks of good governance in every sector.

The question of chairing: a built-in conflict?

Most UK university senates are chaired by the vice-chancellor or a deputy. Historically, this reflected a ‘primus inter pares’ view of the VC as the symbolic leader of the academic community. But in an era of highly executive leadership, that framing no longer holds.

When the chair of senate is also the person being held to account for academic performance, we face an inherent conflict of interest. It is no surprise that senates become risk-averse, muted, or even passive. An effective oversight body needs an independent chair, not necessarily adversarial, but separate from the executive.

One possible solution: a senate chair jointly appointed by a panel of council and senate members, ideally with demonstrable academic leadership experience but separate from day-to-day institutional management.

Most codes of good governance, including the CUC code, emphasise the importance of independence in chairing oversight functions, yet university senates often fall outside this standard, with limited debate on whether this longstanding arrangement still serves its purpose.

Looking beyond UK higher education: clinical senates and other models

There are useful analogies in other sectors. In the NHS, clinical senates were created to provide independent, multidisciplinary advice on strategic service changes. They offer a model of expert, non-executive scrutiny – not decision-making, but critical challenge with public legitimacy.

While clinical senates are not sovereign bodies, they exemplify a governance function that is lacking in many universities: informed, independent academic and professional challenge to strategic decisions. They show that challenge is not oppositional, it is protective, ensuring quality and confidence in decisions that affect many.

In the United States, academic senates (often called faculty senates) play a significant role in institutional governance, though their structure and power vary widely across institutions. A key point of divergence from many UK models is how these senates are chaired and how academic authority is expressed. Unlike in many UK universities, US academic senates are rarely chaired by the president (equivalent to the UK vice-chancellor). Instead, the chair is almost always a faculty member, elected by peers, often serving a fixed term. The president or provost may attend meetings and participate in discussions, but their role is consultative, not directive. This structural separation preserves the independence of the academic voice, enabling the senate to function as a genuine deliberative and oversight body on matters of curriculum, academic standards, research, and faculty affairs.

Many US senates have constitutional autonomy to initiate or reject policies affecting the academic life of the institution. In major public research universities – such as the University of California system – academic senates have legally defined powers codified in institutional bylaws and even state legislation. They approve degree programs, set admissions standards, and oversee faculty appointment and promotion criteria.

The US model demonstrates that a strong academic voice, structurally separate from the executive, can exist without impeding institutional effectiveness. On the contrary, many American universities regard the faculty senate as a critical safeguard for academic quality, integrity, and shared governance. The elected chair model fosters a sense of peer accountability and democratic legitimacy. While cultural and regulatory contexts differ, the US example offers a powerful counterpoint to the assumption that executive-led senates are necessary. For UK institutions considering reform, this model underscores the viability – and value – of a more independent, faculty-led senate structure.

Is culture an excuse?

It’s often said that governance functions ‘depend on culture’ and there is some truth in this. But culture should not be used to excuse the absence of challenge, scrutiny or oversight. Lots of universities, and indeed other organisations, excuse quirks or lack of clarity or normalcy in their models of governance through either through the excuse of an enabling culture or organisational contextual difference. Both are ill-judged rationales. Enabling cultures are valuable only when they enable challenge. Culture must serve governance, not replace it.

Good governance is not infinitely adaptable. It rests on principles — independence, transparency, accountability, and assurance. Culture and or local practice, should reflect those principles, not bypass them.

Practical takeaways: a path forward

1. Redefine senate as an oversight body - Move beyond the binary of advisory vs. decision-making. Senate’s role in assuring academic standards and compliance requires it to act as an oversight body, even if it shares power with the executive.
2. Clarify accountability structures - Make explicit in governance documents that academic executives are accountable to senate for delivery of academic strategy, performance, quality and regulatory compliance. Don't leave it to implication.
3. Reform chairing arrangements - Consider moving away from automatic executive chairing of senate. Explore joint appointment models or election by a panel of senate and council members to safeguard independence.
4. Review and reform senate terms of reference - Ensure they reflect oversight, specify the basis of chairing, clarify accountability pathways, and align with regulatory expectations.
5. Review information flows - Ensure senate receives robust, regular reporting on academic risks, student experience, teaching quality, research performance, and OfS compliance. Scrutiny cannot happen without data.
6. Embed senate’s role in institutional governance reviews - When assessing governance effectiveness, include senate’s functioning as a core lens: does it provide assurance, scrutiny, and legitimate challenge?
7. Reclaim the language of stewardship - Senate is not just a forum, it is a steward of academic integrity. That role demands confidence, clarity and structural backing.

Final thought

In a more precarious and politicised sector than ever, universities need governance that is both principled and fit for purpose. Senate should not be an echo chamber for executive decisions, nor a historical ornament left from a more collegial age. It must be a vital mechanism of academic assurance, oversight, and collective stewardship. If it cannot deliver that, it must evolve or risk becoming irrelevant just when it is most needed.