Reflections on the new draft CUC code

23 April 2026

Daniel Taylor reflects on the new draft CUC code, and what it means for higher education going forward

 

“Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow.”
— T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men

 

A code arriving at a difficult moment

The draft 2026 CUC Code of Governance arrives at an awkward moment for UK higher education, where financial fragility is no longer confined to a few stressed institutions, academic risk is increasingly difficult to contain within the language of assurance, student outcomes regulation has become sharper and more consequential, and public trust is being tested in ways that feel cumulative rather than episodic. In England, the regulatory model now places governing bodies more explicitly on the hook for compliance, accountability and student outcomes, with the accountable officer model reinforcing the expectation that boards oversee institutions through a modern executive-governance lens; in Scotland, the post-Dundee environment has similarly hardened expectations around governing body ownership of performance, risk and integrity. 

Against that backdrop, a refreshed governance code is not simply a routine update or a periodic restatement of good practice. It is, whether intended or not, a statement about how the sector now understands stewardship at a point where the consequences of getting governance wrong are becoming harder to absorb, narrate or explain away.

In that sense, the Code matters a great deal. It also explains why, for many people who spend time inside governance rather than describing it from a distance, the reaction to it has been a faint but persistent sense of underwhelm, not because it is careless, weak or directionally wrong, but because it feels familiar at precisely the point where familiarity is part of the problem. The draft itself is clearly intended to strengthen expectations around culture, risk, assurance and board effectiveness, and the CUC has presented it as a near-final draft for public comment following extensive consultation. 

The constraints are real, but they are not neutral

There is, of course, a straightforward and in many ways compelling defence of the Code, which is that it is attempting to operate across a sector that is structurally diverse, politically exposed and regulated in different ways across the UK, and that any attempt to produce something more prescriptive would either collapse under that weight or become performative very quickly. A principles-based, apply-or-explain approach is therefore not just pragmatic but, given the diversity of institutional forms, missions and constitutional arrangements, probably unavoidable. The draft Code says exactly this, and there is nothing inherently weak about that choice. 

But that constraint is not neutral in its effects. Designing for universality tends to produce convergence on what the sector can collectively accept, rather than what it most needs to confront, and the result is a document that is careful, balanced and credible, but rarely displacing. It reflects where the sector has arrived in its thinking about governance, rather than forcing it very far beyond it.

That matters because higher education governance is not simply diverse in the way that corporate boards differ by sector or strategy. It is historically layered, constitutionally uneven and culturally distinctive. Some institutions still operate with strong, historically rooted senates conceived as sovereign academic bodies; others have more managerial academic boards with narrower remits; some have modernised their governance arrangements in ways that align relatively comfortably with contemporary regulatory expectations, while others retain structures, assumptions and habits formed in a different era and only partially adapted to the logic of a governing body, chief executive and accountable officer model. That diversity makes prescriptive coding difficult, but it also means that the sector’s governance weaknesses are not only technical. They are historical and institutional. 

What codes can do, and what they cannot

It is worth being clear, at a more technical level, about what a governance code is actually for. Codes can set norms, shape a common language of good governance, provide a framework for reflection and justification, and create a degree of soft accountability through apply-or-explain or comply-or-explain disciplines. That is not nothing. The FRC is explicit that the UK Corporate Governance Code works through application of principles and comply-or-explain provisions, while the Charity Governance Code describes itself as a voluntary framework that helps shape a common view of what good looks like rather than a regulatory requirement. The 2020 CUC Code made the same point in sector-specific terms, noting that good governance practice is complex and goes beyond adoption of the Code. 

What codes do not do, however, is exercise judgement, rebalance power in real time, surface uncomfortable truths by themselves, or compel boards to act when the institutional, relational or reputational costs of doing so feel too high. Even the strongest principles-based codes rely on interpretation, seriousness and courage in application. That is why it is too simple to dismiss codes as “mere description”, but also too naive to imagine that they are mechanisms for delivering good governance in any direct sense. They are enabling frameworks, not delivery systems.

This matters to the critique of the draft CUC Code because it helps locate the real question. The issue is not whether the Code can, by itself, produce good governance; it plainly cannot. The issue is whether it does enough to change the terms on which boards interpret their role, explain their choices, and understand the relationship between governance structures, stewardship and outcomes. On that test, it is more mixed.

Purpose, stewardship and culture: right, but not new

Where the Code is strongest is also where it is least surprising. Its language around purpose, values, culture, stewardship and challenge is clear and well judged, and the emphasis on long-term success, board culture and active rather than passive governance reflects a genuine strengthening compared with older, more procedural understandings of board effectiveness. The draft’s opening sections are particularly explicit that the board is the primary governing authority, that it must promote long-term sustainable success in the delivery of purpose, and that culture and behaviours are central determinants of effectiveness. 

This aligns quite closely with the intellectual direction of King IV and the way GGi has been using the emerging King V framing, where governance is understood not simply as oversight of compliance or structure, but as ethical and effective leadership in pursuit of defined outcomes, with stewardship, legitimacy, performance and value creation held together rather than treated as separate concerns. Your own recent work on HE governance has been moving in a very similar direction, particularly in arguing that governing bodies should not be reduced to procedural oversight forums, but should function as coherent stewards of institutional purpose, academic integrity and long-term value. 

But none of this will feel unfamiliar to boards, or indeed to institutions that have experienced governance failure. The more uncomfortable truth is that many of the failures the sector has been reflecting on in recent years did not occur because boards lacked this language. They occurred in organisations that could articulate purpose clearly, that had values statements, that undertook reviews, that could describe the difference between governance and management, and that would, in all likelihood, have scored reasonably well against many elements of a code. The issue has not generally been the absence of the right concepts. It has been what happens when boards are required to act on those concepts in conditions that are uncertain, contested, politically difficult or institutionally painful.

That is where governance tends to fail, and it is the area where the Code, perhaps inevitably, is quieter.

Fragmentation, assurance and the problem beneath the architecture

One of the strongest threads running through your own HE articles is the argument that the real weakness in university governance often lies not in the absence of structures but in the fragmentation of responsibility across structures that are individually rational but collectively hard to navigate. Boards are formally accountable for everything but directly responsible for relatively little; academic governance sits alongside corporate governance but is only partially integrated into it; student experience is treated as strategically central but operationally diffused; and assurance is generated through multiple channels that do not always combine into a coherent picture. That analysis feels especially relevant here. 

The draft Code goes some way to recognising this, particularly in its treatment of academic governance and assurance. It rightly insists that boards must engage more actively in academic assurance, develop sufficient competence to scrutinise it, understand the relationship with academic governance structures, and receive assurance that is fit for the board’s purposes rather than simply recycled from academic committees. Given the pressure created by the OfS quality and student outcomes regime, and the wider fragility of academic business models and partnership arrangements, that is an important strengthening. 

But the underlying issue is not simply the presence or absence of structures or reporting lines. It is whether boards can form a coherent and reliable understanding of how the institution is actually performing, academically as well as financially, and whether they are willing to act on that understanding when it challenges established narratives, executive assurances or long-standing assumptions about viability and risk. This is why the real weakness in HE governance is often not lack of architecture but a gap between architecture and judgement. The Code improves the architecture of assurance; it is less powerful on the social and political conditions under which assurance becomes meaningful.

Outcomes, not just alignment

This is where the relative absence of a more explicit outcomes discipline becomes noticeable. The draft Code places considerable emphasis on alignment, whether to purpose, to values, to strategy or to risk appetite, all of which are necessary conditions for good governance. But alignment is not the same as effectiveness, and one of the sector’s recurring weaknesses has been the tendency to treat it as if it were.

Boards can be satisfied that decisions are consistent with purpose without being confident that they are delivering the intended outcomes. Assurance processes can become more sophisticated without necessarily improving insight into what is actually happening in relation to academic quality, student continuation, student experience, research integrity or institutional resilience. This is particularly evident in academic governance, where large volumes of information do not always translate into a clear line of sight to quality, standards or emerging risk, and where responsibility is distributed in ways that can make accountability difficult to locate in practice. That is one of the central arguments running through your pieces on academic assurance, student experience and the council-senate-executive relationship, and it is one the sector ignores at its peril. 

A stronger articulation, drawing more obviously on King-style thinking, might have placed greater emphasis on the board’s responsibility not only to ensure alignment with purpose and process, but to demonstrate how governance contributes to sustainable value, academic quality, student outcomes and institutional legitimacy. That would not have solved the sector’s governance problems, but it would have pushed the Code more clearly beyond procedural modernisation towards an outcomes-based conception of stewardship.

The normative model, and the unresolved tensions beneath it

Another reason the draft can feel technically right but strategically incomplete is that it sits within a broader direction of travel that is increasingly clear across regulation, law and governance practice, namely towards the normative model of an accountable board overseeing an executive led by a chief executive or equivalent accountable officer. In England this is explicit in the OfS regime, where the governing body must ensure compliance and nominate an accountable officer; in charity law, trustees remain legally responsible for acting in the charity’s best interests and having regard to public benefit; and in wider governance practice the board-chief executive distinction is by now deeply embedded. 

The problem is that universities do not sit neatly inside that model. They carry historic bicameral or tripartite traditions, academic sovereignty claims, and deeply varied constitutional settlements, all of which interact unevenly with the modern logic of executive accountability and unitary board responsibility. Your own writing has been especially good on this point: the issue is not whether universities should resist modern governance altogether, but whether they have modernised the whole system coherently, including senate or academic board, rather than importing corporate expectations at board level while leaving academic governance structurally ambiguous or culturally underpowered. 

The draft Code acknowledges some of this, but it does not fully inhabit the tension. It expects boards to own academic assurance more actively, while still operating in institutions where the academic executive, senate, academic board and council can relate to one another in radically different ways, and where some of the deepest governance failures arise precisely because formal accountability and real authority do not line up cleanly. That is not a criticism of the drafters so much as a recognition that the sector’s governance problem is partly constitutional. A code can point towards better practice, but it cannot, by itself, resolve those tensions.

Behaviour, power and the limits of principle

There is also a deeper question about behaviour and power which sits behind much of this. The Code is right to emphasise culture, challenge and the role of the Chair, and to set expectations about how boards should operate and how poor behaviour should be addressed. But governance failures in higher education rarely arise because those expectations are absent. They arise in situations where challenge is formally encouraged but informally constrained, where information is technically available but practically filtered, where academic mystique or executive confidence suppresses scrutiny, and where boards, collectively, stop short of pursuing issues to the point where they would require genuinely uncomfortable decisions.

These are not failures of framework. They are failures of judgement, confidence and, sometimes, courage.

That is why the increasing emphasis on board effectiveness reviews, culture, behavioural norms and external scrutiny is both necessary and insufficient. It may improve self-awareness and raise the baseline of expectation, and the evidence from the Scottish Funding Council’s recent work suggests that effectiveness reviews can indeed surface recurring weaknesses and strengthen oversight expectations. But reviews and codes do not eliminate the asymmetries of information, authority and institutional loyalty that so often sit at the heart of HE governance failure. 

A stronger code would not solve this, but it might sharpen it

None of this means the Code should be dismissed. Taken as a whole, it is a serious and thoughtful document, which reflects genuine learning, aligns with contemporary governance thinking, and provides a credible framework for boards that are committed to improving their governance. It is clearly stronger on culture, risk, assurance, board effectiveness and academic governance than more procedural or generic predecessors. 

But it also feels, in important respects, like a description of good governance rather than a strong lever for changing how governance is practised. That is not because codes are supposed to “deliver” governance directly; they are not. It is because, even within the proper limits of what a code can do, this one remains more comfortable at the level of principle, architecture and behavioural aspiration than at the level of outcomes, institutional courage and the unresolved structural tensions that now sit at the centre of higher education governance.

It tells the sector, with increasing clarity, what it already broadly understands to be true. The more difficult question is why that understanding has so often failed to translate into effective stewardship, particularly in relation to academic risk, institutional sustainability and the realities of student experience.

Perhaps that is a question no code can fully answer.

But it does suggest that the real test of this Code will not be how elegantly it is written or how comprehensively institutions map themselves against it, but whether boards use it to ask questions they have previously been able to avoid: about viability, about the relationship between senate and council, about whether assurance is genuinely integrated, about where authority and accountability really sit, and about whether the institution’s governance system as a whole is capable of supporting the kind of judgement that present conditions now demand.

Without that, it risks becoming something the sector already has in reasonable abundance: a clearer description of good governance in a system that still struggles, under pressure, to practise it.

Concluding thoughts: a code for a challenging now 

Which leaves a final, and perhaps more important, question: is this the Code that can help influence and steward higher education governance through the next period, one that is likely to be defined less by incremental improvement and more by difficult choices about viability, purpose and public value? It may be, but only in a limited sense.

The Code provides a clearer articulation of what good governance should look like, and it raises expectations in ways that are both necessary and overdue. It may help some boards to think more carefully about their role, to strengthen their approach to assurance, and to reflect more honestly on their own effectiveness. In that sense, it can contribute to better governance. But its influence will remain indirect, contingent and uneven, because the underlying challenge facing the sector is not a lack of frameworks or principles, but the translation of those principles into judgement in circumstances where the costs of doing so are real.

That is why the comparison with King IV, and now King V, is instructive. Their enduring influence does not rest simply on the articulation of principles, but on a more coherent philosophy of governance, one that connects purpose, stewardship, value creation, legitimacy and performance, and treats governance not as a set of structures or behaviours but as an integrated practice of leadership over time.

In that framing, the governing body is not simply aligning decisions to purpose or assuring itself that risks are controlled. It is continuously asking whether the organisation is creating sustainable value, whether it is acting with integrity in its context, and whether it will leave the organisation stronger, more legitimate and more viable than it found it.

That is a more demanding conception of governance than most codes can comfortably express. The CUC Code moves towards it, but does not fully inhabit it. Which suggests that, as with previous iterations, its real value will depend less on the text itself than on how boards choose to use it — whether as a framework for explanation, or as a prompt to engage more seriously with the questions that will define the next phase of higher education governance.

Prepared by GGI Development and Research LLP for the Good Governance Institute.

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